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August 2006 1 Introduction
While all companies can be expected to respond to taxation and capital market conditions
with their ¯nancing and investment decisions, transnational or, in general, multinational
corporations seem to have enhanced opportunities to do so. This includes well-known
strategies of tax deferral, transfer pricing, or the use of intercompany loans in order to
¯nance investment but extends to many more, often rather complex, strategies. While it
is di±cult to assess to which extent the transnational corporations' e®orts in tax-planning
activities contribute to the low turnout of corporate tax revenue in countries like the US
or Germany, at least for the case of the US, tax-planning by multinationals seems to be
an important factor (Gravelle, 2004, Desai, 2005). The adverse revenue consequences are
a temptation for tax policy to change details in the tax law or its administration and
sometimes restrict the use of certain types of tax-planning. However, the many dimensions
along which the multinational corporation can structure its activities have already led
to rather complex national tax policies with regard to transnational activities (Gresik,
2001). In this situation, it is not obvious that an attempt to restrict tax-planning is very
e®ective. Moreover, if it is e®ective, it is not clear that the corporations' response to a
restriction is generally bene¯cial for the imposing country. Since, as has been discussed in
the theoretical literature, restricting certain opportunities for tax-planning might result in
adverse consequences for the level of investment undertaken by multinationals in high-tax
countries which may also reinforce tax-competition (e.g., Keen, 2001, and Peralta, Wauthy,
and van Yperserle, 2006, see also Janeba and Smart, 2003, and Panteghini, 2006).
1One particularly important element in multinational corporations' tax-planning is their
ability to structure the ¯nances in terms of debt and equity not only for the corporation as
a whole but also internally (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004). Apart from the direct revenue
losses, enhanced opportunities for saving taxes may give the multinational an advantage
against companies operating only at a national level. For those reasons, governments often
impose restrictions on the capital structure choice. In fact, the imposition of so called
Thin-Capitalization rules, which deny interest deductions on intercompany debt if the
debt-equity ratio or interest expenses exceed certain thresholds, is widespread. In 1996
half of the 24 OECD countries considered in the empirical analysis below have imposed
those rules. Until 2004 the share has increased to almost 75%. Despite its widespread
use, however, evidence on the e®ects of restrictions on corporate ¯nancing and investment
decisions is generally lacking.
In this paper we investigate the e®ects of Thin-Capitalization rules on multinationals'
¯nancing and investment decisions. A theoretical model shows the basic consequences
of imposing Thin-Capitalization rules on the subsidiary of a foreign corporation for the
debt-asset ratio as well as for the level of investment. The empirical analysis employs
a comprehensive micro-level panel database of virtually all German multinationals made
available for research by the German Bundesbank. As in the analysis of Desai, Foley, and
Hines (2004) the panel data structure and the possibility to identify all foreign a±liates
belonging to the same multinational allow us to control for the heterogeneity across com-
panies. A further advantage of the data is that under German tax law repatriated foreign
2pro¯ts are almost completely exempt from corporation taxes such that taxation at the
location of the a±liate is decisive for the ¯nancing and investment decisions of a±liates.
The results show a signi¯cant positive impact of local taxes on the ¯nancial structure but
also an adverse impact of Thin-Capitalization rules indicating that these rules are e®ective
to some extent. Moreover, investment is found to be more sensitive to taxes if debt ¯nance
is restricted supporting the theoretical concerns about reinforced tax competition.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a theoretical background con-
sidering the ¯nancing and investment decisions of a multinational corporation and derives
empirical implications. More speci¯cally, we model a company, active in two countries,
which uses equity and debt subject to the presence of Thin-Capitalization rules. Section 3
discusses the empirical implications for leverage and investment and discusses the investi-
gation approach. The subsequent sections provide an empirical analysis using panel-data
for the German multinationals in the period from 1996 until 2004. Section 4 gives a short
description of the dataset, before Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 contains the
conclusions.
2 Theoretical Background
Standard theories of the capital structure (e.g., Myers, 2001, Auerbach, 2002) emphasize
that in making their capital structure choice corporations trade o® the gains from an in-
3crease in the leverage, obtained through a larger interest deduction from taxable pro¯ts,
against the increase in the agency cost of debt, re°ecting the inability to solve potential
con°ict between equity and debt claimants by means of contracts. Assuming that a corpo-
ration has more than one location, this approach could be extended also to a transnational
or multinational company. However, in this case a±liates have improved access to credit
as the company might use intercompany loans rather than only external credit in order to
increase the leverage of a±liates in high-tax countries. The ¯nancing decision of the multi-
national corporation, thus, may be particularly sensitive to local tax rates with adverse
consequences for the local tax revenue.
Facing the increased ability of multinational corporations to make use of the tax shield by
debt in high-tax countries, governments are tempted to restrict the use of debt by means of
Thin-Capitalization or Earning-Stripping rules. Those rules typically limit interest deduc-
tion up to a ¯xed relation between equity and debt, usually quali¯ed as the debt which is
¯nanced by a shareholder, or deny the deduction of interest expenses above certain thresh-
olds. Then, the interest paid for an excess leverage cannot be deducted from the tax base.
In practice, Thin-Capitalization rules are often not limited to debt directly ¯nanced by
shareholders. Tax administration or legislation will usually also prohibit what is known
as back-to-back constructions, where the a±liate issues external debt, which is, however,
guaranteed or secured by a deposit from the parent-company.1 To keep the following dis-
cussion simple, we will treat the Thin-Capitalization rule mostly as a restriction on debt
1An example is constituted by the US Earnings Stripping rules (Sec. 163 (j) IRC).
4¯nance without always distinguishing between internal and external debt. Nevertheless,
for the empirical analysis we should keep in mind that Thin-Capitalization rules does not
restrict the interest deduction of all kinds of debt.
To derive the impact of Thin-Capitalization restrictions on corporate decisions we model
the decisions of a multinational company with two locations 1 and 2 which is assumed to
maximize the following pro¯t function
¼ = (1 ¡ ¿1)f (k1) + (1 ¡ ¿2)f (k2)
¡ [(1 ¡ ¿1)i1¸1k1 + (1 ¡ ¿2)i2¸2k2]
¡ [(1 ¡ ¸1)k1 + (1 ¡ ¸2)k2]r












where f (kj) denotes the output at location j where kj units of capital are employed. ¿j is
the local tax rate on capital income. The second and third lines capture the interest and
opportunity cost of capital, where ¸j denotes the share of capital ¯nanced with debt, ij is
the rate of interest for debt issued in country j, and r indicates the opportunity cost of
equity capital. Before considering the pro¯t function further, let us brie°y discuss the tax
incentive for using a higher leverage. Suppose that i2 is not di®erent from r. Then a shift
towards debt ¯nance at location 2 (higher ¸2) will tend to raise pro¯ts as a larger part of the
earnings of capital is tax deductible. Even in this situation the corporation will not ¯nance
5all capital with debt due to the agency cost of debt. This is captured by the fourth line,
which introduces the agency cost determined by a function of each subsidiary's debt-equity
ratio cj (¸j).2 In order to facilitate the analysis, the agency cost function is assumed to be
convex.3 The agency cost function is indexed with the host country to re°ect the potential
role of this country's credit-market regulations and conditions for the underlying con°ict
between debtors and creditors. Note that the importance of this con°ict might very well
also vary between ¯rms. But, since we are concerned with a single ¯rm, this is not captured
in the speci¯cation of the pro¯t function. The imposition of a Thin-Capitalization rule is
re°ected by the ¯fth line, where the pro¯t function is extended to take account of the
additional tax payments arising from an excess leverage above the limit ¸j. In order to
consider cases with and without restrictions on the tax deduction of interest, we will set
'j = 1 if a Thin-Capitalization rule exists in country j and 'j = 0, otherwise. If 'j = 1,
the restriction imposed is binding when ¸j > ¸j.
For the optimum share of debt used by an a±liate, say ¯rm 2, we obtain the ¯rst-order
2Note that the agency cost function is kept rather simple. A more general speci¯cation would allow for
cross-subsidiary e®ects of the leverage on the agency cost ci (¸j;¸i). However, if the own e®ect dominates













r ¡ (1 ¡ ¿2)i2 ¡ '2i2¿2 ¡ c2;¸ (¸2)
! = 0: (1)
Accordingly, the leverage is determined by the cost of equity relative to debt. If '2 = 0 and
r > (1 ¡ ¿2)i2, the convexity of c2 implies that ¸2 is positive. In other words, if the after-
tax rate of interest is below the required return on equity, there will be some borrowing.
If '2 equals 1, the marginal cost of borrowing jumps up to i2 as the tax deduction is no
longer granted. As a consequence, the leverage ¸2 is reduced. If r > i2 a leverage will still
be chosen above ¸2, but if i2 > r > i2 (1 ¡ ¿2) we have a corner solution such that the
leverage is chosen to be just equal to the threshold level ¸2.
The ¯rst-order condition for the capital stock at location 2 is
(1 ¡ ¿2)f




'2i2¿2 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸2)r ¡ c2 (¸2)
! = 0: (2)
Accordingly, the stock of capital is chosen such that the after-tax marginal product equals
the marginal cost of the investment consisting of the interest cost (second and third term),
of the opportunity rate of return (fourth term), and of the agency cost of debt (last term).
Without restrictions on debt ¯nance ('2 = 0), the borrowing costs are reduced due to
the tax deduction. If a Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed and binding ('2 = 1), the
tax deduction is limited, borrowing is more costly, and the costs of the investment are
increased. The consequence will be a lower level of investment.
7With regard to empirical implications it is important to note that the imposition of restric-
tions on debt ¯nance will not only a®ect the capital structure and the level of investment
of capital; it will also a®ect the sensitivity of investment and leverage to the tax rate. The
tax sensitivity of investment is of particular interest, as it would usually be an important
determinant of a country's tax policy. To study the impact on the tax sensitivity, let us
derive the comparative static e®ects of an increase in the tax rate by di®erentiating the











































First, consider the case without a Thin-Capitalization rule ('2 = 0). Given the above
assumptions, the term is positive and the strength of the response depends on the interest
rate and on the agency cost function. But, if there is a Thin-Capitalization rule in place
and is binding ('2 = 1), the tax rate e®ect disappears.








f00 (k2)(1 ¡ ¿2)
: (4)















where ´2 = ¡
f00(k2)k2
f0(k2) is the absolute value of the elasticity of the marginal product. If
this elasticity is non-decreasing in the level of capital k2,4 we can state that the lower
level of investment k2 and the lower deduction of interest cost under conditions of a Thin-
Capitalization rule ('2 = 1) will lead to a higher tax sensitivity of the capital stock.5 The
intuition for this result is that with lower tax deductions a larger part of the earnings is
a®ected by the corporation tax. The corporation tax exerts, therefore, stronger e®ects on
investment.
4This assumption is not particularly restrictive. With production function of Cobb-Douglas type, for
instance, the elasticity of the marginal product would be constant.















; if ' = 1;
where k2 is the amount of capital invested under ¯nancial constraints, which, as we know from the ¯rst-
order condition, cannot exceed k2. Thus, we know that i2¸2
f0(k2) is smaller than i2¸2
f0(k2), which proves our
statement.
9The pro¯t function utilized to derive these comparative static e®ects embodies the implicit
assumption that the interest rate for the subsidiary located in, say, country 2 is the local
rate of interest i2. In case of an intercompany loan this seems questionable as the lending
part of the multinational could charge a di®erent interest rate. In fact, if the ¯rm could
freely determine ¯nancial transfers between its subsidiaries it could completely shift pro¯ts
out of the high-tax location (Mintz and Smart, 2005). Yet, under the arm's length principle
the corporation would have to charge an interest rate not much di®erent from the market
rate. Thus, if we assume that all debt at location 2 is internal, the pro¯t function would
di®er only in using the same interest rate at the lending and the borrowing part of the
company, i1 in our example. As long as the after-tax rate of interest is below the required
return on equity
r > (1 ¡ ¿2)i1;
the comparative static e®ects are not changed, qualitatively. However, the empirical anal-
ysis below is not focused on the impact of the interest rate and also does not distinguish
between internal and external debt. But, we should keep in mind that depending on the
importance of intercompany loans not only the local interest rate in the host country of
the a±liate matters but also that in other locations such as the parent's country.
103 Empirical Implications
The ¯rst{order conditions and the corresponding comparative static e®ects suggest that
the leverage of the a±liate in country j is a declining function of the after-tax rate of
interest, if no Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed. Then, a lower interest rate and a higher
tax rate would lead to an increase in the leverage. But, if a Thin-Capitalization rule is
imposed in the host country and is binding, the leverage will be reduced and will show less
tax sensitivity.
In order to empirically test these predictions we ¯rst specify an estimation equation for
the leverage of an investment in country j held by company k in period t
LEVj;k;t = a0 + a1xj;k;t + a2¿j;t + a3 logij;t + a4THCj;t + a5¿j;tTHCj;t + ak + at + ²
LEV
j;k;t :
where at is a time-speci¯c and ak is a company-speci¯c e®ect. Note that the former also
captures the interest rate at the parent location if we consider a set of companies which
share the same parent location. The company-speci¯c e®ect encompasses the company-
speci¯c opportunity cost of capital which might include elements of personal taxation at
the level of the shareholder. It will also control for company-speci¯c determinants of the
agency cost of debt. xj;k;t captures further characteristics of the subsidiary which a®ect
the use of debt or the access to credit. As the interest rate ij;t is more di±cult to measure,
instead of using the after-tax rate of interest (1 ¡ ¿j;t)ij;t, the above speci¯cation separates
11out interest and tax rates and makes use of the fact, that the tax rate can be regarded as
an approximation to the log of unity minus tax rate. In order to allow for the case where
a Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed we introduce a dummy THCj;t indicating whether
such a rule is imposed or not, where we expect a4 to show a negative sign. To test for
the reduced tax sensitivity we include a further interaction term with the tax rate where
a5 should show the opposite sign than a2. Note that the estimation simply introduces
information about the existence of a Thin-Capitalization rule but no further information
about how likely it may be that the constraints will restrict the capital structure choice of
the individual corporation. This re°ects ¯rst-of all the di±culty to assess in greater detail
the speci¯c rules in each country. Moreover, we should note that whether or not a rule is
binding is co-determined by the government and the individual company. Therefore, the
use of information about how likely the rule is binding raises problems of identi¯cation.
With regard to the stock of capital invested by the a±liate an empirical analysis is much
more involved as the production function as well as the market conditions for the ¯nal
product will be di®erent for each ¯rm and investment - even if we have neglected those
di®erences in the theoretical analysis. Hence, it might be useful to include further controls
which capture di®erences in the cost of production, as, for instance, labor cost or distance
as an indicator of transport cost, or which capture product-market conditions as the market
size, proxied, for instance, by the level of GDP. Of course, some of the details of the tax
system need also to be taken into account. In fact, whereas the theoretical analysis above
was essentially concerned with the statutory tax rate, in case of investment the depreciation
12allowances should be taken into account as well. The tax savings from depreciation are
introduced by means of an interaction term of the present value of depreciation allowances
(dj;t) with the statutory tax rate, formally denoted by dj;t¿i;t.
Following the above theoretical discussion a reasonable speci¯cation for the amount of
capital invested is
logCAPj;k;t = b0 + b1zj;k;t + b2¿j;t + b3ij;t (6)
+ b4THCj;t + b5THCj;t¿j;t + b6dj;t¿j;t + bk + bt + ²
CAP
j;k;t :
where bt is a time-speci¯c and bk is a company-speci¯c e®ect. zj;k;t contains several controls,
which may or may not be company speci¯c. These will re°ect di®erences in the market
size, in the local production cost, or in variables which a®ect the capital structure choice
as captured above by xj;k;t.
As above, we might want to test the implications of Thin-Capitalization rules. To test for
an impact on the level of investment we introduce a dummy for the imposition of such
rules in the host country. A di®erent tax sensitivity of the capital stock is tested for by
an interaction term between the Thin-Capitalization dummy and the statutory tax rate,
where b5 should be negative if the tax sensitivity is increased.
134 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis employs micro-level data for multinationals provided by the German
Bundesbank. This includes a comprehensive annual database of direct investment stocks
of German enterprises held abroad. More precisely, the data provides information about
each foreign subsidiary's balance sheet and some further information about the ownership
and about the German investor. In its current version, ¯rm-level panel data for foreign
subsidiaries are available for the period 1996 to 2004. Data collection is enforced by German
law, which determines reporting mandates for international transactions.6
Since our model is concerned with a multinational corporation which jointly determines
the capital structure at both a±liates we focus on majority owned subsidiaries. As the
model assumes a two-tier company structure, also indirectly held investment is excluded.
Furthermore, as the underlying model deals with a case where production takes place at
each location, holdings and ¯nancial service providers as well as observations with non-
positive capital and turnover are excluded.
In order to capture the tax incentive on the capital structure, the analysis employs the
statutory tax rate on corporate income modi¯ed by applicable restrictions on interest
6Sec. 26 Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (Law on Foreign Trade and Payments) in connection with Aussen-
wirtschaftsverordnung (Foreign Trade and Payment Regulations). Each German multinational has to
report its foreign assets including both direct FDI and indirect FDI conditional on some lower threshold
level for mandatory reporting. Since 2002, FDI has to be reported, if the participation is 10% or more
and the balance sheet total of the foreign object is above 3 Million Euro. For details see Lipponer (2006).
Though previous years showed lower threshold levels, we apply this threshold level uniformly for all years
in the panel.
14Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Firm level variables
Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) (e 1 Mill.) 10.3 101 .0001 14,400
Turnover (e 1 Mill.) 50.7 344 1 51,900
Leverage .609 .249 .0002 1
Loss carry-forward .293 .455 0 1
Tax variables
Statutory tax rate .344 .071 .1 .532
PVD (d) .795 .054 .664 .914
Thin-Capitalization dummy .772 .420 0 1
Further characteristics
Lending rate 7.17 3.99 1.77 27.31
Hourly labor cost (US $) 16.56 .644 2.73 34.64
GDP (Bill. US $) 1,685 2,866 17.5 11,734
Distance (in km) 1,963 3,126 190 16,431
Corruption perception 6.92 1.73 3.42 10.0
43,626 observations representing 24 countries observed over the period 1996 to 2004.
15deductions, such as in the case of the Italian local business tax (IRAP). Thus, the statutory
tax rate represents the tax savings from deducting one unit of interest.
Since the e®ective tax reduction from using debt might be zero if a subsidiary carries
forward any losses for tax purposes (MacKie-Mason, 1990), we also use a dummy variable
indicating whether some loss carry-forward is reported. Of course, the existence of some
losses in the previous periods may capture other characteristics of the current decision
problem of the company, such as the expected performance of an a±liate. Thus, the
overall e®ect on leverage might well be ambiguous.
As the ¯rm-level data does not provide any information about ¯rm-speci¯c interest ex-
penses, we employ the lending rates for the private sector taken from the IMF Inter-
national Financial Yearbook augmented, where possible, with data from the European
Central Bank. Furthermore, in order to control for company-speci¯c variation in the bor-
rowing conditions we employ the turnover, as an indicator of the size and the cash-°ow of
the a±liate both of which will generally be positively associated with the borrowing condi-
tions faced by the a±liate. As agency cost may also vary across industries, we control for
further heterogeneity by including dummies for 71 industries at the level of the a±liate.
With regard to the analysis of the level of capital we employ some additional controls. This
includes hourly labor cost in manufacturing as available from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. We also employ a distance variable which has proved important in previous
analysis of FDI. This variable will capture the distance of the foreign a±liate to its German
16Table 2: German Outbound FDI 1996 - 2004
Host Country Observations Capital Share of TCR
(e 1,000) Debt
Number Percent Mean Mean
Australia 958 2.20 17,757 .620 1
Austria 2,590 5.94 25,429 .606 0
Belgium 1,868 4.28 38,768 .631 1
Canada 782 1.79 30,501 .534 1
Czech Republic 2,534 5.81 25,781 .614 1
Denmark 757 1.74 19,145 .654 1 b)
Finland 355 0.81 24,937 .556 0
France 5,456 12.51 26,439 .643 1
Great Britain 3,710 8.50 29,535 .590 1
Greece 404 0.93 22,246 .651 0
Hungary 1,591 3.65 36,795 .561 1 a)
Ireland 363 0.83 20,856 .506 0
Italy 3,289 7.54 29,036 .720 0 d)
Japan 1,096 2.51 55,661 .670 1
Luxembourg 41 0.09 17,188 .702 1 c)
Netherlands 2,354 5.40 28,554 .576 1
Norway 370 0.85 22,843 .603 0
Poland 2,949 6.76 19,905 .602 1 b)
Portugal 573 1.31 26,079 .561 0
Slovakia 466 1.07 31,423 .569 1 e)
Spain 2,729 6.26 33,348 .607 1
Sweden 1,041 2.39 20,701 .616 0
Switzerland 2,931 6.72 19,025 .547 1
USA 4,419 10.13 55,861 .582 1
Total 43,626 100.00 30,557 .609 .772
a): since 1997, b): since 1999, c): since 2002, d): since 2004, e): abolished 2004.
17parent. In order to capture the market size we include a GDP variable. The list of variables
is further augmented by a corruption perception index as the prevalence of corruption may
deter foreign direct investment (e.g., Wei, 2002). Finally, of course, we utilize a dummy
variable reporting the existence of Thin-Capitalization rules in the host country. While
this variable is based on annual information it shows only weak variation over time. The
countries considered seem to have adjusted their Thin-Capitalization rule only rarely. Table
1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics on the size and geographic distribution of the
foreign subsidiaries analyzed. The list of host countries includes 24 countries, 14 of these
countries are EU members before 2004, 3 have joined the EU in 2004.
5 Results
The results for the leverage as presented in Table 3 show a signi¯cant positive impact of
the tax rate: an increase in the tax rate by 10 percentage points results in an increase
in the leverage by 3.4 to 4.4 percentage points depending on the speci¯cation. With a
coe±cient of about 0.35 the size of the coe±cient in speci¯cation (2) is remarkably close
to the ¯nding of Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) who report an impact of 0.33 in a similar
speci¯cation, which also uses company-level ¯xed e®ects but replaces the local lending
18rate with several credit-market indicators.7 Speci¯cation (2) also shows a positive impact
of the turnover which is in accordance to a positive impact of liquidity on the access to
credit. The lending rate of the host country does not show much signi¯cance. However,
as shown by Desai et al. (2004) and con¯rmed in Buettner et al. (2006), the local lending
rate exerts o®setting e®ects on external and internal debt, where the latter might be more
sensitive to the lending rate at the parent's location, which is absorbed by the time-speci¯c
e®ects. In column (3) the dummy for the existence of a Thin-Capitalization rule shows the
expected negative e®ect suggesting that the leverage is about 5 percentage points lower in
countries imposing such ¯nancing constraints. Column (4) reports results of a speci¯cation
where, in addition, an interaction e®ect between the tax rate and the Thin-Capitalization
dummy is included. The signi¯cant negative impact indicates that the tax sensitivity is
reduced in countries which impose such constraints. Summing up our ¯ndings so far, the
analysis of the capital structure supports the theoretical predictions. A±liates in countries
which impose Thin-Capitalization rules do have a lower leverage and do show a lower
tax-sensitivity of the leverage.
A problem with the above analysis is that we have treated the tax policy in terms of
tax rates and in terms of the imposition of restrictions on interest deduction as being
unrelated. However, one might argue that not all countries are equally likely to impose debt
restrictions. Rather, high-tax countries which should be the prime focus of tax-planning
7Gordon and Lee (2001) report a leverage e®ect of taxes using US ¯rm-level data of about 0.36. Mintz
and Weichenrieder (2005) report results for foreign a±liates of German corporations of between 0.3 and
0.57 depending on speci¯cation. Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodµ eme (2006) report a somewhat lower estimate
of 0.27 for a sample of European corporations.
19seem more likely to impose those rules. If the impact of the tax rate is non-linear, perhaps
due to the convexity of the agency cost, the interaction term with the Thin-Capitalization
dummy might simply re°ect the higher tax-sensitivity of high-tax countries. But, as can
be seen from column (6) employing a quadratic speci¯cation, there is no evidence for
corresponding non-linearities. Note that other non-linear speci¯cations also failed to show
signi¯cance.
Table 4 provides results for the size of the capital stock invested as captured by the level of
Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE). All estimations account for company-level as well
as time and industry-level ¯xed e®ects. The ¯rst column employs a speci¯cation where
the tax rate as well as its interaction with the depreciation allowances are considered. In
accordance with theoretical predictions, a lower statutory tax rate and higher tax savings
due to tax depreciation are both associated with a higher level of investment.8 With regard
to the further control variables we may note, ¯rst, that the lending rate proves insigni¯cant.
One might have expected a negative e®ect, but, as noted above, if the local lending rate is
high, relatively, external debt might become substituted by internal debt, which will not
be responsive to the local lending rate. If no control for the turnover is included, the GDP
shows a positive e®ect pointing to a positive role of the market size. Labor cost show a
negative e®ect which is in accordance with the view that investment decisions are deterred
by high labor cost provided that there is no strong capital-labor substitution in the choice
8While the statutory tax rate was adjusted in order to take account of special provisions for debt ¯nance
(see above), for the purpose of studying investment, both the basic statutory tax as well as the adjusted
tax rate would matter. However, probably due to the rather small di®erences between the two tax rates,
various alternative speci¯cation showed no signi¯cant di®erences.
20Table 3: Results: Determinants of the Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax rate .376 ? .347 ? .337 ? .434 ? .441 ?
(.044) (.045) (.039) (.052) (.198)
Tax rate square -.010
(.266)
TCR -.050 ? -.002 -.002
(.009) (.025) (.025)
TCR £ Tax rate -.141 ? -.142 ?
(.077) (.080)
(log)Lending rate .005 .011 ? .006 .003 .003
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.007)
Loss carry-forward .053 ? .056 ? .059 ? .059 ? .059 ?
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
(log)Turnover .002 .009 ? .010 ? .010 ? .010 ?
(.002) (.002) (002) (.002) (.002)
Industry e®ects no yes yes yes yes
R2 .0404 .0660 .0749 .0752 .0752
Dependent variable: Debt/asset ratio of foreign subsidiaries. Company-level and time
¯xed e®ects included. Standard errors in parentheses are robust against random ¯rm-
speci¯c, time, and country e®ects using the usual Huber-White sandwich formula. An
asterisk denotes signi¯cance at 5% level. 43626 observations, 4256 ¯rms.
21Table 4: Results: Determinants of PPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tax rate -1.95 ? -1.90 ? -1.45 ? -1.67 ? -1.63 ? -1.27 ? -1.21
(.957) (.912) (.862) (.709) (.681) (.652) (.1.10)
Tax rate squared -.081
(1.17)
Tax rate £ PVD 1.62 1.64 ? 2.89 ? 1.16 1.17 2.21 ? 2.20 ?
(.999) (.958) (.943) (.754) (.721) (.698) (.703)
TCR .088 ? .861 ? .070 ? .706 ? .707 ?
(.039) (.131) (.027) (.116) (.117)
Tax rate £ TCR -2.22 ? -1.83 ? -1.83 ?
(.338) (.309) (.313)
(log) Lend. rate -.001 .012 -.010 .009 .019 .001 .000
(.043) (.044) (.040) (.032) (.033) (.030) (.030)
(log) GDP .194 ? .177 ? .166 ? .012 -.001 -.010 -.010
(.018) (.016) (.015) (.014) (.013) (.012) (.012)
(log) Labor cost -.191 ? -.149 ? -.153 ? -.263 ? -.229 ? -.232 ? -.232 ?
(.042) (.038) (.036) (.031) (.030) (.028) (.028)
(log) Distance .002 .011 .044 ? .053 ? .060 ? .087 ? .087 ?
(.020) (.018) (.018) (.016) (.015) (.015) (.015)
(log) Corruption .172 ? .125 ? .233 ? .168 ? .131 ? .219 ? .218 ?
(.066) (.068) (.066) (.055) (.059) (.056) (.062)
(log) Turnover .748 ? .748 ? .747 ? .747 ?
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.013)
Loss carry-forw. .096 ? .094 ? .100 ? .100 ?
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016)
R2 .2426 .2430 .2446 .4138 .4141 .4151 .4151
Dependent variable: logarithm of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) of foreign sub-
sidiaries. Company level, time, and industry ¯xed e®ects included. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust against random ¯rm-speci¯c, time, and country e®ects using the
usual Huber-White sandwich formula. An asterisk denotes signi¯cance at 5% level. 43626
observations, 4256 ¯rms.
22of technology. While distance shows no e®ect in the basic estimation, the perception of
corruption shows the expected adverse e®ect.9
Speci¯cation (2) includes the dummy for the existence of a Thin-Capitalization rule. Ac-
cordingly, the level of capital invested is higher in countries which impose such rules. While
one can speculate whether this is attributable to the di±culties in capturing all determi-
nants of investment decisions, we should note that this result deviates from the theoretical
predictions. Speci¯cation (3) includes the interaction term with the statutory tax rate
which exerts a signi¯cant negative e®ect. This supports the above hypothesis of a higher
tax sensitivity of capital if a Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed. This speci¯cation shows
a strong increase in the value of the Thin-Capitalization dummy as well, but an evaluation
of this coe±cient around the mean reveals that the mean di®erence in the level of PPE
between countries imposing restrictions and those, which don't, is preserved. Columns (4)
to (6) of Table 4 report results, where we include, in addition, two ¯rm-speci¯c controls,
turnover and loss carry-forward, which have been used in the above leverage regressions.
The results do not change much, except that distance now shows strong positive e®ects.
This seems reasonable given that the speci¯cation conditions on the attractiveness of the
market as captured by the turnover variable.
The wrong sign of the Thin-Capitalization dummy again points at the above mentioned
problem that we have not explored the reasons behind the decision to impose debt-
restrictions. Again, to make sure that the interaction with the Thin-Capitalization dummy
9Note that the index is computed such that a lower perception results in a higher value.
23is not just re°ecting a higher tax-sensitivity of high-tax countries, we tested for nonlinear
e®ects in the tax rate. Representative for those estimations, the table reports a speci¯-
cation with the squared tax rate in column (7) which does not show a signi¯cant impact.
Thus, once again, the signi¯cance of the interaction e®ect between Thin-Capitalization
rule and the tax rate cannot simply be ascribed to non-linearities in the impact of the tax
rate.
We can summarize the results for the level of investment in terms of property, plant, and
equipment by stating that the theoretical expectations are met only partly by the empirical
evidence. While we could not ¯nd an adverse e®ect of the existence of Thin-Capitalization
rules on the level of investment, the tax sensitivity is found to be increased. To some
extent the failure to get stronger results is related to the low time-series variation in the
imposition of Thin-Capitalization rules which prevent the use of more robust empirical
approaches as for instance the inclusion of country-speci¯c e®ects.
6 Conclusions
The theoretical analysis has shown that the imposition of Thin-Capitalization rules tends
to reduce the leverage and the capital stock of a±liates located in countries imposing such
rules. Further comparative static e®ects point at a lower tax sensitivity of the debt-asset
ratio in countries imposing those rules. The tax sensitivity of the capital stock invested in
24a country should, however, be increased in the presence of Thin-Capitalization rules.
The empirical investigation of the leverage and the value of property, plant, and equipment
of the a±liates of German multinationals in 24 countries in the period between 1996 and
2004 o®ers some support for the theoretical predictions. The leverage in countries with
Thin-Capitalization rules is found to be reduced signi¯cantly, suggesting that these rules
cannot easily be circumvented. Also the lower tax sensitivity of the leverage is con¯rmed
in the estimations. While there is some reason to believe that Thin-Capitalization rules are
mainly imposed by high-tax countries, the results indicate that the higher tax sensitivity
is not simply caused by non-linear e®ects in the tax rate.
With regard to the level of property, plant, and equipment held by an a±liate, the analysis
con¯rms the usual determinants found in previous empirical studies: lower tax rates, a
higher present value of tax depreciation allowances, a higher level of GDP, and a lower
level of corruption all exert positive e®ects. While the sensitivity to the statutory tax rate
is found to be higher in countries where a Thin-Capitalization rule is imposed, the amount
of capital invested is not lower in countries, which impose a Thin-Capitalization rule. Of
course, this result may be due to some omitted variable problem. But, the low variation in
the imposition of Thin-Capitalization rules over time prevents us from further exploration
of this point.
The higher tax sensitivity of investment under the restriction of a Thin-Capitalization rule
suggests that the adverse consequences of taxation on investment become stronger if the
25government imposes those restrictions. In a non-cooperative setting, therefore, tax policy
faces a di±cult trade-o® between the real consequences of corporate taxation and the rev-
enue loss from the tax-planning of multinationals. As not restricting tax-planning would
basically mean that the tax system discriminates against locally operating ¯rms, and, thus,
also distorts the decision to operate multinationally rather than domestically (Bucovetsky
and Hau°er, 2005), there seem to be good reasons to impose restrictions on interest deduc-
tion. Thus, the higher tax sensitivity of investment under those constraints predicted by
the theory and con¯rmed by the empirical analysis suggests that an optimal policy should
combine a restriction on tax-planning by means of debt ¯nance with a reduction in the
overall tax burden on corporate pro¯ts. Just by imposing restrictions, policy cannot escape
the fundamental question about the corporation tax raised by the process of globalization.
Datasources and De¯nitions
Firm-level data are taken from the micro-level dataset (MiDi) of the Bundesbank, see
Lipponer (2006) for an overview. The leverage is determined by the level of balance-
sheet liabilities divided by total capital consisting of registered capital, capital re-
serves and pro¯t reserves.
Corporate taxation data are taken from the IBFD, and from tax surveys provided by
the tax advisory companies Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG. The statutory tax rate
variable contains statutory pro¯t tax rates modi¯ed by applicable restrictions on
interest deductions.
Thin-Capitalization information is from the same source as the tax data.
Present values of depreciation are calculated for investments in machinery, assuming
a discount rate of 7.1 percent. Depreciation rules are taken from the references
26considered in case of corporate taxation data (see above).
Lending rates refer to credits to the private sector taken from the IMF International
Financial Yearbook (2005) augmented with corresponding ECB ¯gures.
GDP in U.S. Dollars, nominal. Source: World Economic Outlook Database.
Hourly compensation of workers: Hourly compensation costs in U.S. Dollars for pro-
duction workers in manufacturing. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and
Eurostat.
Distance is taken from \www.etn.nl/distance.htm".
Corruption Perception Index is published annually by Transparency International which
ranks countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert
assessments and opinion surveys. The scores used range from 10 (country perceived
as virtually corruption-free) to 0 (country perceived as almost totally corrupt).
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